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Utopia Reconsidered: The Modern Firm as
Institutional Ideal 1
John Dobson
This paper challenges Alasdair MacIntyre's assertion that the modern firm - such as Google, Unilever, or
Microsoft - is inimical to human flourishing within an Aristotelian framework. The paper begins by
questioning MacIntyre's rendering ofutopian communities. It then addresses four specific criticisms ofthe
modern firm to be found throughout MacIntyre's oeuvre, namely compartmentalisation, myopia,
inequality, and loss ofcommunity. Arguments are made to the effect that these criticisms do not vitiate the
institutional role ofthe modern firm in an Aristotelian context. The paper concludes with an invocation
ofthe modern firm as institutional ideal within an evolving utopian vision ofhuman flourishing. This is
a utopian vision in which the modern firm plays a constructive, not corruptive, institutional role.

Introduction
In the introductory article to this special issue of Philosophy ofManagement, Alasdair MacIntyre
reintroduces us to the plight of traditional New England fishing communities. His is a tale of a
fallen Eden: a tradition of the virtues built up over generations rapidly destroyed by capitalist
modernity. Indeed throughout his oeuvre MacIntyre has conjured a broad array of these Edens:
Fishing communities, Welsh mining communities, farming coops in Donegal, Mayan towns in
Guatemala and Mexico, ancient Greek city states, Greek highland villages, medieval Christian and
Arab kingdoms, Scottish highland clans before 1600, the Sioux nation, Bedouin of the Western
desert, and the Irish of the Blasket Islands. 2 MacIntyre does not claim that every aspect of these
societies was admirable. But what he does claim is that each possessed utopian attributes; that is to
say attributes conducive to the cultivation of virtue-nurturing practices; where a practice is 'any
coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity'3. In the case of
Welsh mining communities, for example, he admires 'a way oflife informed by the ethics of work at
the coal face, by a passion for the goods of choral singing and of rugby football and by the virtues of
trade union struggle against first coal-owners and then the state'4.
When a MacIntyrean practice functions well, participants therein pursue internal goods of
excellence by cultivating cardinal virtues of character such as wisdom, justice, integrity, and
constancy; and by nurturing virtues of acknowledged dependence, such as just generosity, that bind
the community. In addition, the key to healthy practices is to have them supported materially by
institutions that, while supplying the external goods of material support, do not interfere with the
practice's pursuit of the internal goods of excellence.
Thus MacIntyre argues that, from the study of the above communities, we can learn how to build
institutions that nurture healthy practices. But why can we not learn this from our own institutions
of capitalist modernity? We cannot, according to MacIntyre, because the institutions of modernity
such as the for-profit corporation (referred to hereafter as the 'modern firm') - corrupt practices.
They do this in two ways. First, modern firms privilege the pursuit of external goods such as wealth
and status while recognizing internal goods (i.e., goods derived from exercising the virtues within
practices) only to the extent that the latter serve the attainment of the former. Second, modern firms
do not just do this accidentally: modernism has rendered the agents of modernity - in the current
11 wish to acknowledge the administrative assistance of Cassandra Depew, and the helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this paper from other participants in this special issue
2 Alasdair MacIntyre 'Utilitarianism and Cost-Benefit Analysis: an essay on the relevance of moral philosophy
to bureaucratic theoty' in Kenneth Sayte (ed.) Values in the Electric Power Industry Notre Dame University of
Notre Dame Press 1977; Dependent Rational Animals Illinois Open Court Publishing 1999; 'Corporate
Modernity and Moral Judgment: are they mutually exclusive?' in Kenneth E. Goodpaster and Kenneth Sayre
(Eds.) Ethics and Problems ofthe 21" Century Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1979
nd
3 Alasdair MacIntyre After Virtue 2
Ed Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1985 p 187
4 MacIntyre Alasdair 1999a Dependent Rational Animals l1linois: Open Court Publishing p 143
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context corporate managers - incapable of exercising sound moral judgment. Thus, as MacIntyre
states in his introductory article to this special issue: 'The practice of the virtues, conceived as
Aristotle and Aquinas conceived them, is something difficult to reconcile with functioning well in
the present economic order... '.
Some authors attempt to reconcile MacIntyre with modernity by adopting a 'MacIntyre-lite'
approach in which they separate MacIntyre's institution-practice-virtue construct from his broader
critique of capitalist modernity. They then attempt to usefully apply the former to the modern firm
while ignoring the latter; arguing that the modern firm either is, or could be made to be, an
institution conducive to practices. The problem with this approach is that it inevitably bumps up
against MacIntyre's macro-critique of capitalism, leading authors of this genre to advocate some
form of semi-modern firm: a non-profit firm, or a Christian firm, or a feminine firm 5 • Not
surprisingly, given his views on capitalism, MacIntyre rejects this approach outright6 •
So to defend the modern firm as it actually exists today in the form of say Microsoft, Unilever, or
Google requires tackling MacIntyre head-on: tackling both his micro-critique of the modern firm,
and his macro-critique of capitalism. This paper takes up that challenge. Although the primary
focus here is the modern firm, rather than capitalism, the two are of course inseparable: the modern
firm exists entirely within the capitalist embrace, and could exist nowhere else. So any defence of the
modern firm is by default a defence of capitalism.
The central argument here is that MacIntyre is too critical of capitalism in general and of the
modern firm in particular. He fails to recognise the extent to which the modern firm is able to
provide non-corruptive institutional support for activities that can be reasonably defined as
practices. As Crockett concludes from his behavioural study of modern managers, included in this
special issue: 'MacIntyre's theoretical construct, thus interpreted (and despite his pessimism), can be
empirically identified in modern commercial endeavors'. Indeed the continuing interest in
MacIntyre's work among management and business scholars bears witness to the power of his
conceptualisation. MacIntyre provides an invaluable prism through which human organisation can
be arrayed in terms of internal goods, external goods, virtues, practices, and institutions. The papers
contained in this special issue - and the many other papers referenced therein - reflect the power of
MacIntyre's construct.
Unfortunately, however, through his limited discussion of contemporary business and his atavistic
renditions of utopian farming and fishing communities and the like, MacIntyre tends to portray a
caricature of the modern firm. Perhaps due to his experiences in the electrical power industry,
discussed below, MacIntyre dwells heavily on the bureaucratic nature of the modern manager. He
gives little weight to the dynamism and idealism that characterise many modern firms and the
managers therein (as for example discussed by Keat, and discovered empirically by Crockett, in this
special issue). Of course such things as internal goods and human flourishing are notoriously
difficult to pin down empirically, but what I hope to show below is that at least some of MacIntyre's
concerns surrounding the modern firm - vis-a.-vis its ability to provide institutional support for
practices - can be allayed.
In the next section I address four basic concerns about the modern firm that appear regularly in
MacIntyre's writings: compartmentalisation, myopia, inequality, and loss-of-community. I present
evidence to the effect that, although these are undoubtedly justified concerns, they are nuanced and
need not necessarily serve to indict the modern firm. In the final section I argue that, even within
the virtue-practice-institution framework, the modern firm is an institutional form capable of
supporting a valid utopian ideal.

5 Geoff Moore and Ron Beadle 'In Search of Organizational Virtue in Business' Organization Studies 27 no 3
2006 P 369-389 and Dobson John 1996 'The Feminist Firm: A comment' Business Ethics Quarterly 6 no 2 p
227-232
6 Alasdair MacIntyre op cit 1999 P 145
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MacIntyre's Critique of the Modem Firm
Compartmentalisation
MacIntyre opens his introductory article to this special issue by revisiting one of his long-standing
concerns surrounding the modern firm, namely compartmentalisation7 • The actors within modern
firms, namely managers, are unable to act as true moral agents. In their actions as managers they
compartmentalise themselves within the confines of a morally stunted version of utilitarianism,
namely cost-benefit analysis. The milieu of the modern firm renders them blind to considerations
beyond the financial 'bottom line'. Managers become Albert-Speer like technicians, diligently
managing train timetables to ensure the 'efficient' delivery ofJews to concentration camps8.
For example, in Social Structures and their Threats to Moral Agency, MacIntyre discusses 'a business
corporation whose chief executive officer decides to exaggerate the progress made by the
corporation's scientists on a research project, with the aims both of not losing customers to rivals
and of bolstering share prices'9. MacIntyre argues that the 'only grounds on which objection to such
deception can be based, if it is to be heard, is that in the longer run deception will fail to maximize
corporate profits'lo. Some twenty-two years earlier, in Utilitarianism and Cost-Benefit Analysis,
MacIntyre similarly observes that 'once the executive is at work the aims of the public or private
corporation must be taken as given. Within the boundaries imposed by corporate goals and legal
constraints the executive's own tasks characteristically appear to him as merely technical'll. And he
concludes the article by stating that the 'moral considerations underlying cost-benefit analysis are
simply suppressed'll. In Corporate Modernity and Moral judgment, MacIntyre appears to stray from
this theme of the manager-as-pure-technician when he opines that 'the modern corporation presents
itself as a moral being; it is because of this that businessmen are as sensitive as they are to moral
criticism'13. But he ,returns unambiguously to the former theme later in the same article when
noting: 'In his capacity of corporate executive, the manager not only has no need to take account of,
but must not take account of certain types of considerations which he might feel obliged to
recognize were he acting as parent, as consumer, or as citizen'14. Similarly, in After Virtue, in listing
managers - along with therapists and aesthetes - as one of the principle 'characters' that define
modernity, MacIntyre argues that managers 'conceive of themselves as morally neutral characters
whose skills enable them to devise the most efficient means of achieving whatever end is proposed.
Whether a given manager is effective or not is on the dominant view a quite different question from
that of the morality of the ends which his effectiveness serves or fails to serve'IS. And finally, in Why
are the Problems of Business Ethics Insoluble?, MacIntyre returns solidly to the theme of
compartmentalisation: 'With one part of the self one is a corporate executive understanding every
project in terms of a suitably narrow conception of cost-benefit analysis and ignoring large side
effects of one's activity... Effectiveness in organizations is often both the product and the producer
of an intense focus on a narrow range of specialized tasks which has as its counterpart a blindness to
other aspects of one's activity'16.
Alasdair MacIntyre 'Social Structures and their Threat to Moral Agency' Philosophy 74 no 289 July 1999 pp
311- 329
8 Ibid and Geoff Moore 'Re-imagining the morality of management: a modern virtue-ethics approach'
Proceedings of Alasdair MacIntyre's Revolutionary Aristotelianism 29'h June to 1" July 2007; see also Ian
Mangham 'MacIntyre and the Manager' Organization 2 no 2 1995 pp 181-204 Stanley Deetz 'Character,
corporate responsibility and the dialogue in the postmodern context' Organization 2 no 2 1995 pp 217-225
Laura Nash 1995 'Whose Character? A response to Mangham' Organization 2 no 2 1995 pp 226-232 and
George Randels 'Morality and the Manager after MacIntyre' Organization 2 no 2 1995 pp 205-211
9Alasdair MacIntyre 'Social Structures and their Threat to Moral Agency' (op.cit) p 322
10 Ibid P 323
11 Alasdair MacIntyre 'Utilitarianism and Cost-Benefit Analysis: an essay on the relevance of moral
philosophy to bureaucratic theory' (op.cit) p 218
12 Ibid P 237
13 Alasdair MacIntyre 'Corporate Modernity and Moral Judgment: are they mutually exclusive?' (op.cit) p
124
14 Ibid P 126
15 Alasdair MacIntyre After Virtue (op.cit) p 74
16 MacIntyre Alasdair 'Why are the Problems of Business Ethics Insoluble' in Bernard Baumrin and Benjamin
Friedman (Eds.) Moral Responsibility and the Professions New York: Haven Publishing 1982 p 357-358
7
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Is MacIntyre correct? Does the modern firm induce moral compartmentalisation? Do the managers
of modern firms frame every decision in terms of a narrowly defined cost-benefit analysis? Do they
leave their humanity and morality at the door when they enter the boardroom?

It is certainly true that project evaluation criteria such as net present value or economic value added
are quantitative techniques that weigh economic costs against economic benefits. But even
corporate finance texts, which educate future managers in the use of these techniques, explicitly
discuss their limitations. For example Brigham and Houston, in Fundamentals of Financial
Management, clearly state that 'decisions must be made using a combination of judgment and
numerical analysis'17. Of course, as Lee Salter helpfully pointed out in his comments on an earlier
draft of this paper, what textbooks advocate and what students end up actually doing can diverge
significantly. But at least the textbooks - even the 'hardcore' finance textbooks - acknowledge a
world beyond the narrow confines of cost-benefit analysis. Indeed any qualified manager realises, or
at least should realise, that these quantitative tools are heuristic methodologies based on a host of
value judgments: not just economic-value judgments concerning the estimation of relevant cash
flows and interest rates, but also moral-value judgments informed by the personal values of the
individual manager, the collective cultural values of the practice in which the manager is involved
(these may be stated explicitly if the practice is say auditing or financial advising), and the values of
the corporate institution itself (these may also be stated explicitly in a mission statement of
corporate credo). Of course the material temptations in business are great, as witnessed by the
ongoing litany of corporate 'scandals'. But at least the institutions surrounding the modern firm,
and the modern firm itself, bring these transgressions to light and recognize them as such.
The active role of moral agency in the modern firm is further evidenced by the now vast and ever
expanding business-ethics literature, replete with articles by practising managers agonising over the
moral quandaries inherent in their managerial roles. This is further evidenced by the many ongoing
ethics lecture-series held at many business schools in which managers typically discuss their on-the
job moral deliberations: for example, the Raytheon ethics lecture-series at Bentley College,
Massachusetts, and the Markkula series at Santa Clara University, California. These belie
Macintyre's claim that 'there is no milieu available to them [managers] in which they are able,
together with others, to step back from those roles and those requirements and to scrutinize
themselves and the structure of their society from some external standpoint with any practical
effect'18. Indeed - as Ron Beadle suggests in his comments on an earlier draft of this paper - within
the virtue-practice-institution construct, this ongoing managerial self-reflection can be viewed as
the pursuit of internal goods within the practice of maintaining the integrity of the institution. 19
Even observers who reside firmly within a modernist perspective on business recognise goods
beyond those valued in a conventionally defined cost-benefit analysis. For example, in his broadly
acclaimed20 book, The Modern Firm: Organizational Design for Performance and Growth, John
Roberts begins with the statement: 'The most fundamental responsibilities of general managers are
setting strategy and designing the organization to implement it'21. He goes on to state that 'Firms
are institutions created to serve human needs .. to provide meaningful experiences'22. He recognises
that this cannot be achieved by applying only explicit criteria (such as cost-benefit analysis),
evaluative criteria such as corporate culture are equally important: 'Culture is the 'softer' stuff, but it
is not less important for that. It involves the fundamental shared values of the people in the firm, as
well as their shared beliefs about why the firm exists, about what they are collectively and
individually doing, and to what end'23. Note well that Roberts observes managers not taking ends as
given. Indeed the observations made by Roberts of actual managerial activity are strikingly similar
to those of Crockett in this special issue. In commenting on managers' responses to his questions,
17 Eugene F Brigham, Joel F Houston Fundamentals of Financial Management Mason OH: South-Western
2007 p 448
18 Alasdair MacIntyre 'Social Structures and their Threat to Moral Agency' (op.cit) p 322
19 Geoff Mooore and Ron Beadle 'In Search of Organizational Virtue in Business: Agents, Goods, Practices,
Institutions and Environments' (op.cit)
20 John Robert's book was selected as 'Business Book of the Year, 2004' by the Economist magazine
21 John Roberts The Modern Firm: Organizational Design for Performance and Growth Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2004 p ix
22 Ibid P 18
23 Ibid
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Crockett concludes that 'the questions were understood in a way approximating Aristotelian
notions'. In other words, managers were not blind to a MacIntyrean-type perspective on their
activities. Indeed, in generally placing excellence above success they appear to agree, at least in crude
terms, with a MacIntyrean hierarchy of goods. To quote Crockett again: 'Interestingly, most
[managers] asserted that the organization would be more likely to achieve success by focusing on
excellence than the opposite [i.e., material rewards]'. These descriptions are strikingly similar to
MacIntyre's prescription that the 'aim internal to such productive crafts, when they are in good
order, is never only to catch fish, or to produce beef or milk, or to build houses. It is to do so in a
manner consonant with the excellences of the craft, so that not only is there a good product, but the
craftsperson is perfected through and in her or his activity'24. As Roberts concludes: 'solving the
problems of strategy and organization is an act of real creativity'25.
As with Roberts, leading financial-economist Michael Jensen does not characteristically view
business through a MacIntyrean prism. But, on the few occasions when Jensen does venture into a
broad discussion of the nature and purpose of business, we again find descriptions amenable to a
virtues-practices-institutions schema: 'Value maximization is not a vision or a strategy or even a
purpose; .. people .. must be turned on by the vision or the strategy in the sense that it taps into
some human desire or passion of their own - for example, a desire to build the world's best
automobile or to create a film or play that will move people for centuries'26. So here we see Jensen,
albeit inadvertently, making a distinction that can readily be seen as analogous to that of internal
and external goods; and note well that for Jensen the internal goods are the motivator and the
external goods the way of 'keeping score'. He continues:
Value seeking tells an organization and its participants how their success in achieving a vision or in
implementing a strategy will be assessed. But value maximizing or value seeking says nothing about
how to create a superiot vision or strategy. Nor does it tell employees or managers how to find or
establish initiatives or ventures that create value... Defining what it means to score a goal in football
or soccer, for example, tells the players nothing about how to win the game. 27
Jensen's soccer example invites parallels to MacIntyre's discussion of the internal goods of chess:
'those goods specific to chess, in the achievement of a certain highly particular kind of analytical
skill, strategic imagination and competitive intensity'28. So, in summary, far from leaving their
moral agency at the door when entering the boardroom, moral agency lies at the heart of managerial
decision-making in the modern firm.

Myopia
This introduces another of MacIntyre's major concerns with the modern firm, namely that of
myopia: 'The failure to be responsible for the future is not just a product of the negligence of
individuals, but is rooted in the forms and tendencies of organizational and corporate life'29. He'
connects this to the narrow focus on cost-benefit analysis, which he believes forces managers to set
arbitrary, and likely short-term, horizons; 'in a private profit-seeking corporation the current rates
of return expected on investment will place constraints on such a choice of dates .. '30 This becomes
manifest in Macintyre's two fishing crews, to be discussed in more detail below: the first modern
firm-like crew is given the appearance of a much more myopic and nomadic operation than the
traditional crew.
24 Alasdair MacIntyre 'A Partial Response to my Critics' in John Horton and Susan Mendus (Eds.) After
MacIntyre: critical perspectives on the work ofAlasdair MacIntyre Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press
2004 p 284
25 John Roberts 'The Modern Firm: Organizational Design for Performance and Growth Oxford' (op.cit) p
286
26 Michael Jensen 'Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function' Social
Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection 2001 p 16
27 Ibid
28 Alasdair MacIntyre After Virtue (op.cit) p 187
29 Alasdair MacIntyre 'Why are the Problems of Business Ethics Insoluble' (op.cit) p 357
30 Alasdair MacIntyre 'Utilitarianism and Cost-Benefit Analysis: an essay on the relevance of moral
philosophy to bureaucratic theory' (op.cit) p 232
Philosophy of Management Volume 7 Number 1 2008

71

'\

....

-John Dobson
Keat, in this special issue, discusses MacIntyre's fishing crews at length. Keat concludes, however,
that myopia is a characteristic of certain types of modern firm operating in certain milieus - namely
liberal as opposed to coordinated market economies - rather than as a necessary characteristic of
modern firms as such. But, as Jensen points out, even the 'liberal' modern firm recognises the need
for long-term goals: 'we must give employees and managers a structure that will help them resist the
temptation to maximize short-term financial performance .. short-term profit maximization at the
expense of long-term value creation is a sure way to destroy value'3l. Indeed, in Capitalism at the
Crossroads, Hart observes similarly that 'the firm must not only perform efficiently in today's
businesses, but it should also be constantly mindful of generating the products and services of the
future'32.
In the broader context of MacIntyre's utopian communities, some archeological evidence indicates
that - at least in the context of natural resource depletion - pre-modern communities were the real
sufferers from myopia: 'American Indians often so pressured or depleted basic resources like land
and trees that they had to switch from one type of food to another or move the locations of their
villages'33; similarly; the indigenous pre-modern culture of Easter Island collapsed when all the trees
on the island were 'myopically' felled 34 .

Inequality
Another way in which the modern firm frustrates human flourishing, according to MacIntyre, is its
effect on wealth distribution. In Why are the Problems ofBusiness Ethics Insoluble?, MacIntyre claims
that 'the larger the piece of the cake taken by one group or individual, the smaller will be the pieces
left for everyone else'35. This logic rests on the cake itself not growing significantly. But in their
recent book Good Capitalism Bad Capitalism, Baumol et al. point out that while world population
grew by 1.6 billion people from 1978 to 2000, the number of people with incomes below $1 per
day declined by more than 300 million 36 . Of course this gets into issues of welfare versus wealth, but
suffice to say here that MacIntyre's anti-modem-firm claims surrounding poverty are debatable
empirically.
MacIntyre's main concern, however, appears to be not so much the absolute levels of wealth but
rather how that wealth is distributed. For example, in his introductory article to this special issue, he
recounts how the wealth available through modern corporate fishing technologies tends to foster
greed and corrupt communal ties. Similarly, in Dependent &tional Animals, he asserts that 'gross
inequality of income or wealth is by itself always liable to generate conflicts of interest and to
obscure the possibility of understanding one's social relationships in terms of a common good'3?
This prompts two basic questions. First, to what extent are undesirably-broad levels of income
inequality a necessary feature of the modern firm? Second, more fundamentally, what level of
aggregate income inequality is actually detrimental to human flourishing?
These are clearly complex questions, and detailed answers would require a major digression from
my central argument here. However I would like to note in passing that MacIntyre's views represent
an extreme on a spectrum upon which there are many arguments; both economic and moral. For
example, in a recent review of the literature in the evils-of-income-inequality debate, Brittan opines:
'Equality of income or wealth is neither attainable nor desirable'38. Indeed, there is even no

31

Michael Jensen 'Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function (op cit)

32 Stuart Hart Capitalism at the Crossroads New Jersey: Wharton School Publishing 2007 p 63-64
Shepard Krech III 1999 The Ecological Indian New York: Norton Paperbacks 1999 p 76
Ibid
35 Alasdair MacIntyre 'Why are the Problems of Business Ethics Insoluble' (op.cit) p 352
36 William J Baumaol, Robert E. Litan and Carl J. Schramm Good Capitalism Bad Capitalism New Haven:
Yale University Press 2007 p 21
3? Alasdair MacIntyre Dependent Rational Animals (op.cit)p 144
38 Brittan Samuel 'Summon the Ghost of Lloyd George' Financial Times Friday July 202007 P 9
33

34
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consensus on the much-publicised 'evils' of executive compensation39 . Also, an implication of Keat's
paper in this special issue is that different manifestations of the modern firm can imply broadly
different levels of income inequality. As Roberts notes of Nokia in the 1990s: 'People were simply
expected to do their best .. a top executive described Nokia's people as 'happily badly paid' ..'40.

Loss ofCommunity
Another long-standing concern of MacIntyre's is the extent to which market-based relationships
such as those within and between modern firms 'undermine and corrupt communal ties'41. In
Corporate Modernity and Moral Judgment: Are They Mutually Exclusive?, MacIntyre lists 'four ways
the moral structure of the modern corporate world can be defined by negation - by the striking
absence of honour, of blasphemy, of ceremonial death, and of the story-telling elders'42. Corporate
modernity, according to MacIntyre, lacks a sense of 'cosmic order'43 in which communal narrative,
communal recognition of birth and death, communal belief in the divine, and a communal sense of
honour and insult can all play significant roles.
MacIntyre's concerns prompt two basic questions: First, rather than destroying community, to what
extent is the modern firm simply redefining community? Second, is the destruction of community
at least certain types of community - necessarily a bad thing?
Rather than simply destroying community as such, there is evidence that the modern firm is simply
creating different types of community: more fluid, more all-embracing, more virtual, and no less
virtuous. For example, in Global Microstructures: The Virtual Societies ofFinancial Markets, Cetina
and Bruegger find evidence of the emergence of 'virtual' communities among foreign exchange
traders: ' ..social forms are bound together by electronic information technologies .. drawn together
as if they were in one place'44. In their extensive empirical study the authors find foreign-exchange
traders - typically characterised as the most red-in-tooth-and-claw-type of financial agents 
developing their own social norms, their own conceptions of excellence within the practice of
foreign-exchange trading (although the authors do not use this MacIntyrean terminology), and even
their own language. Similarly, just casual observation of some modern firms - Microsoft, eBay,
Google, and Apple, for example - indicate that, far from destroying communal ties, the modern
firm is continually developing new communities. Indeed, most recently, the rapid growth of social
networking through internet sites such as YouTube, MySpace, and Facebook is all about building
communities. Furthermore, these new communities are far more dynamic, all-embracing and
geographically diverse than their antecedents.
I turn now to the second question, regarding the desirability of community per se. Jacques Derrida,
in deconstructing the concept of 'community', notes that the origin of the word is 'common
munitions', and that communities were traditionally about insularity and forced exclusion45 • The
basic thrust of Derrida's argument is that the common contemporary bemoaning of a 'loss of
community' needs careful scrutiny: such a 'loss' is more a 'realignment' of power structures. For
example, as Frazer and Lacey note in their critique of McIntyre's concept of community and
39 See for example: Candice Prendergast 'The Provision of Incentives in Firms' Journal ofEconomic Literature
XXXVII, March 1999 pp 7-63, Jeffrey Moriarty 'Do CEOs Ger Paid Too Much' Business Ethics Quarterly 15
no 2 April 2005 pp 257-282, John Dobson The Economics and Morality ofExecutive Compensation 2007
(unpublished working paper)
40 John Roberts The Modern Firm: Organizational Design for Performance and Growth' (op.cit) p 174 Also
anecdotally, Apple Computer's CEO Steve Jobs' salary is currently $1 per annum; of course he also owns
many shares and stock-options in Apple, but then so do JUSt about all of Apple's employees. Thus the
currently high value of these claims - which is generally regarded as a direct result of Jobs' stewardship of
Apple over the past decade - is a 'good' shared by all employees and many other stakeholdets of this vety
modern firm.
41 Alasdair MacIntyre Dependent Rational Animals (op.cit) p 117
42 Alasdair MacIntyre 'Corporate Modernity and Moral Judgment: are they mutually exclusive?' (op.cit) p 134
43 Ibid P 133
44 Karin Knorr Cetina and Urs Bruegger 'Global Microstructure: The Virtual Societies of Financial Markets'
American Journal ofSociology 107 no 4 Oanuary 2002) p 909
45 Jacques Derrida. Deconstruction in a nutshell. New York: Fordham University Press 1997, pI 08
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practice : 'Femin ist theory underst ands male power exercised and
mainta ined in and through
practices'.46 Indeed MacInt yre himself recognises, in Depend ent Rationa
l Animal s, that commu nities
'are always open to corrupt ion by narrowness, by complacency, by
prejudice against outsiders and
by a whole range of other deformities, includi ng those that arise from
a cult oflocal community'47.
The empirical questio n arises, therefore, as to whethe r there is less
'narrowness, complacency, and
prejudi ce' in the commu nities of the modern firm than is to
be found in those 'utopia n'
commu nities listed at the beginni ng of this article.

Conclusion: Utopi a Reconsidered
One attribut e that my and Keat's contrib utions to this special issue
have in commo n is an early
reference to fishing. I begin with reference to MacInt yre's descrip
tion of the actual demise of
traditio nal New Englan d fishing commu nities; Keat begins with MacInt
yre's famous hypothe tical
fishing crew compar ison 48 . This all brings to mind Alfred, Lord Tennys
on's famous narrative poem,
Enoch Arden. In the poem, Arden is born into a traditio nal eightee
nth century fishing commu nity,
so he grows up a fisherman. But the material hardships of his life
drive a utopian vision; but note
well that this is not a vision of a life piously devoted to excellence
in fishing, but rather a life of
adventu re and material gain: becomi ng boatswain on a trading ship
to China and 'returni ng rich'49.
Note also that Tennys on does not treat Arden's utopian vision as anythin
g unusua l or deserving of
moral opprob rium. Given the severe hardshi ps and uncerta inties
of the fishermen's and their
families' lives, as described by Tennys on, a desire for material gain is
quite underst andable .
A MacInt yrean observer might argue that, by encroac hing on the
fishing commu nity, the growing
comme rcial trade with China was threate ning the commu nity;
destroy ing a utopia. But clearly
neither Arden nor Tennys on viewed it that way. In essence, the nascent
commercial activity - an
early 'modern firm' in the form of a trading ship - empow ered Arden;
gave Arden a choice. The
trading ship did not awaken in Arden a desire for external goods. Arden
already had that desire; he
had a growing family and a sickly child to support . The opportu nity
to be boatswain on the trading
ship merely offered him a means to acquire external goods. Did
this opportu nity represe nt the
corrupt ion of a practice; the shatteri ng of a utopia? Surely not: life
was hard for Arden, but it was
harder and even more role-limiting for his wife Annie (and no doubt
would have been harder still
for any person of colour who might have venture d into this commu
nity).
But MacInt yreans would counter that, althoug h Arden's situatio
n was characterised by material
hardships, it did nonetheless possess many characteristics of a utopia;
characteristics that would be
lost with encroa ching comme rcial enterpr ise. For exampl e, in
Depend ent Rationa l Animal s,
MacInt yre argues that utopia would be 'inimical to and in conflict
with the goals of a consum er
society'50. But what I hope the argume nts above have demons trated
is that the modern firm and
some valid utopian vision are far from inimical. By this I do not
mean to imply that MacIntyre's
concerns surroun ding compar tmental isation, myopia, inequality,
and loss-of- commu nity have no
merit. These no doubt are concerns that have the potenti al to thwart
human flourishing, and indeed
the business ethics literature is replete with many other concerns surroun
ding the modern firm. The
evidence briefly summa rised here suggests, however, that these concern
s might best be addressed 
and indeed to some extent are already being addressed - by the ongoin
g process of evolution and
creative destruc tion that characterise the modern firm.
Indeed, one powerful message of Tennyson's poem is the fundam entality
of material well-being as a
founda tion for any utopia. Althou gh concep ts of 'happin ess'
are open to differin g moral
interpre tations (as MacInt yre himself discusses in the introdu ction
to this special issue), there is
nonethe less conside rable evidenc e indicat ing a high correla tion
betwee n health, wealth, and

46 Elizabeth Fraser and Nicola Lacey, 1994, "MacIntyre, Feminism and
the Concept of Practice" in John
Horton and Susan Mendus (op.cit) p 27l.
47 Alasdair MacIntyre Dependent Rational Animals (op.cit) p 142
48 Alasdair MacIntyre 'A Partial Response to my Critics' (op.cit) p.284.
49 Alfred Lord Tennyson Enoch Arden, 1865 [1992] New York: Dover Publicat
ions, p.17.
50 Alasdair MacIntyre Dependant RationalAnimals (op.cit) 145

74

Philoso phy of Manag ement Volume 7 Numbe r 1 2008

Utopia Reconsidered: The Modern Firm as Institutional Ideal
happiness for all demographic groupS51. And this includes the elderly and disabled; the latter being
groups MacIntyre is particularly concerned about in Dependent Rational Animals. Also, in The
Moral Consequences ofEconomic Growth 52, Ben Friedman provides evidence to indicate that one
essential ingredient for communal moral health and happiness is economic growth - a view clearly
endorsed by Enoch Arden.
Returning to Dependent Rational Animals, MacIntyre describes utopia in terms of 'rejecting the
economic goals of advanced capitalism'53. My central argument here is that utopia can better be
described in terms of enhancing these economic goals: economic goals need not of necessity corrupt
and destroy 'higher' non-economic goals. To put this in MacIntyrean terms: the material success of
the modern firm does not render it impotent as an institutional foundation for practices. AI; Keat
recently pointed out, 'although the acquisition of consumer 'goods' takes place through exchange
within the market (or economic) domain, the realization of their value typically takes place in nonmarket domains'54. For example, if! wish to pursue the internal goods of chess, the market will not
prevent me from whittling my own chess pieces from a piece of walnut (perhaps within a practicebased community of whittlers) if I so choose; but what it will do is present me with a dizzying array
of alternative chess sets; not to mention some very sophisticated non-human opponents. But note
well the choice to participate in the 'consumer society' is mine; a choice that Annie did not have in
her 'traditional' role as a fisherman's wife.
For sure, en route to utopia, the modern-firm-as-institutional-foundation-for-practices still faces
many challenges: poverty, ignorance, discrimination, exploitation, poor working conditions,
environmental degradation, crass consumerism, to name but a few. But the theme of this article is
that these problems can best be addressed by the ongoing evolution of the modern firm, not by its
destruction.
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51 Richard Layard Happiness: Lessons from a New Science, New York: Penguin Press 2005; William Baumaol,
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